Lefort, Lenin, and other alternatives

Alan N. Shapiro's essay on political philosopher Claude Lefort deserves a look. It's more reminiscence of the role Lefort played in Shapiro's thinking than summary of Lefort's writing but the nut of it is here:

This is a generalization, but many thinkers and political actors who were radical in their youth give up their radicalism as they grow older and become liberals. I can’t help but think of Joschka Fischer – the former leader of the German Green Party and Foreign Minister of Germany from 1997 to 2005 – as a prime example of this. Fischer went from being an opponent of war to being a “leader” of wars in Serbia/Kosovo and Afghanistan. The point is to not give up radicalism for liberalism, but rather to be an advocate of both. To understand how the strengths and best values of both can be united.

Shapiro mentions both Lefort and Richard Rorty as exponents of a liberal/radical hybrid and explicitly rejects recent arguments of Slavoj Žižek's in favor of "repeating Lenin" (see, e.g. this essay), Shapiro writes:

BIG MAN on CAMPUS Slavoj Žižek recently published a couple of books celebrating Lenin, and he has recommended that we turn to Lenin.

Žižek is a funny guy, so it must be a joke. But I don’t get the joke. Lenin was a mass murderer.

Lenin crushed the workers’ councils in factories that were the real heart and soul of the 1917 Russian Revolution. Lenin crushed the movement led by Nestor Makhno in the Ukraine which fought against both the Red and White Armies, resisting state authority, whether capitalist or communist. Lenin crushed the rebellion of the Kronstadt sailors in the Gulf of Finland in 1921. All these repressive acts established the precedent for the suppression of workers’ uprisings by Khrushchev in East Germany in 1953 and in Hungary in 1956, and by Brezhnev in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Some Marxists (I guess Žižek is one of them) believe that Lenin was a brilliant Marxist theoretician. This must also be a joke. Lenin’s second most famous book, after What Is To be Done?, is called State and Revolution. Read this book and you’ll see that Lenin’s so-called “theory of the state” is a non-theory. Lenin’s theorization of the capitalist state is that the state is an “instrument” of the capitalist class (the bourgeoisie). That’s it. He has nothing more to say about the state. That this was the alpha and omega of what Lenin had to say about the state is clearly stated by much more sophisticated Marxist theorists-academicians, in books like The State and Capitalist Society and Class Power and State Power by Ralph Miliband (the father of current British Labour Party leader Ed Miliband) and in essays on the Marxist theory of the state by New York University political science professor Bertell Ollman.

Lenin grants no “autonomy” to the state in his theorization of the state under capitalism. As a theory, it is crude and reductionist, a so-called “reflection” theory. Naturally it follows that Lenin is not going to be the guy to have any theory of the post-revolutionary state. Since the capitalist state is nothing but an instrument of the bourgeoisie, therefore the communist or socialist or Marxist or revolutionary state is going to be, for this blind man, nothing more than an instrument of “the revolution.” Since the revolution is “good,” the revolutionary state must therefore be “good.” Puke! Vomit! Barf! Zum Kotzen!

Shapiro recommends Bernard Flynn's book on Lefort; I am reading it now and will attempt a summary when I'm done. The chapters on Lefort's reading of Machiavelli inspire. Per Lefort, Machiavelli recognized early on that class struggle is inherent in every society, even ones traditionally anchored in religious principles or aristocratic succession. "The Prince" aligns himself with the people against the grandees but provides order through projection of strong leadership. Even princely societies need outlets for public grievances, and Lefort suggests that Machiavelli was subversively calling for revival of a mechanism along the lines of the Roman tribunal (flouting the aristocrats of the day, who stifled dissent while idealizing Rome). Lefort's Machiavellian studies inform his other writing, which sees totalitarianism as a modern aberration -- even more pathological than old-fashioned tyranny in that it perversely tries to suppress conflict and class struggle by defining them out of existence.

hair pair

An emailer floated the term "visual relational aesthetics." That's more than I'd claim for myself but it's not half-bad. We need to start appropriating this terminology from these joyless Marxist a-holes.
"Relational" is already a confused mess. In the Minimalist era the term referred to the relations among parts in a work of art. Artists such as Donald Judd eschewed the relational in favor of obdurate objects that challenged you with their mere existence.
Then the dreaded Nicholas Bourriaud changed the focus of the term to social relations, theorizing a participatory, performative art such as Rirkrit Tiravanija cooking Thai food for art critics, I mean, the people, in the 1990s (a rehash of 1960s-70s performance art). Bourriaud's "relational aesthetics" had nothing to do with '60s relational aesthetics.
Now we have social relations on the Net in the form of Web 2.0 media. Young academics explore the sociological aspect of this "as art" but not so much the visual: puns, portmanteaus, superficial formal relationships interrogating underlying content relationships within the image-exchange context of aggregator websites. Whether the focus is on the graphics, the interchange, or the format, we could use more theory from a visual artist's perspective, rather than from the viewpoint of the latest political actor to take a wrong turn, wander into the art world, and find it eminently colonizable.

Alan N. Shapiro's Diary of a Young Wikipedian + Internet Rant

Writer and technology theorist Alan N. Shapiro participated in a Geert Lovink-initiated conference a couple of years ago on the topic of Wikipedia. Against a chorus of intellectuals bemoaning the small pedantic minds that now shape our discourse, Shapiro proposed making changes to Wikipedia from within and kept a diary of his accepted and rejected language. His chosen topics included Star Trek and Baudrillard.

His "Diary of a Young Wikipedian" appears in the conference publication [link to PDF] and is also republished on his blog (unfortunately without blockquotes so it's hard to tell where sections start and end). The diary includes some sidelines into other conference-related topics, including a "further reading" recommendation he made on the conference mailing list. In response to the recommendation, the following comment was made on the list:

Alan,
So where would you want to go with this? The links that you gave debouch, as they say, onto a very wide field, most of which is far more interesting than the Wikipedestrian defile on whose fruits we currently gorge -- or gag. To your new rhetoric I might well add the golden oldie of Peircean semiotic, but what would be the first critical step in the application to wikioid media?
Jon Awbrey

This kind of breezy academicspeak seems endemic to listServs (after writing it one imagines Awbrey sallying forth in search of some cheese-y comestibles) but Shapiro replied politely. Regarding sign-theorist Charles Peirce (see Wikipedia) Shapiro writes:

...Peirce is the best semiotician, better than Eco or Derrida or Baudrillard or Greimas or Jakobsen, because his viewpoint includes everything about the chains of signs and signifiers that is in their systems, but Peirce also emphasizes meaning, the referent of the sign.

The hypertext cultural theory crowd of the 1990s of Landow, Bolter, Brown University, etc. didn't really get Peirce. A Derrida-only-inspired view of hypertext is exposed to a kind of nihilism of the chain of signifiers, it seems to me.

That explanation came at the tail end of a fine rant by Shapiro on the current internet as a meaning-free zone:

I believe that a Peircian semiotic could be implemented on the Internet (or a successor to the Internet), and that this a very worthwhile goal. A sort of Peircian emphasis on content, meaning, or deep referent as counterpoint to what is currently happening on the Internet, which is the nightmare realization of the fundamental media-theory-insight of McLuhan-Baudrillard that "the medium is the message" gone haywire, on drugs, so to speak. Content means nothing right now. Everything is links, links, links, where can i get my website or blog linked or ping-backed to as many other websites as possible. And this happening in the context of the rampant reign of Homo Economicus. More links to my website equals more visitors equals higher google ranking equals the dream of the pot of gold.

Any chat of any kind today immediately deteriorates into: are you on Facebook?, are you registered at the Huffington Post?, do you have Skype?, MSN?, Yahoo Messenger?, etc. Meet me at odesk or elance and let's get exploited together. That's a nice app you've got, but does it run on iPad? Nice book there, but it is on Kindle? The media that overwhelms the message was TV for McLuhan-Baudrillard. Today that fetishized media is Facebook, skype, MSN, etc.

And add to that list the fetish of "just the facts, ma'am" of the Wikipedia gatekeepers.

social media monopolies - you can live without them, you can't kill them

Good critique of "social media monopolies" by Geert Lovink and Korinna Patelis, posed as a series of rhetorical questions, e.g.:

Social media offer us the virtual worlds we use every day. From Facebook's 'like' button to blogs’ user interface, these tools empower and delimit our interactions. How do we theorize the plethora of social media features? Are they to be understood as mere technical functions, cultural texts, signifiers, affordances, or all these at once? In what ways do design and functionalities influence the content and expressions produced? And how can we map and critique this influence? What are the cultural assumptions embedded in the design of social media sites and what type of users or communities do they produce?

or

Artistic practice provides an important analytical site in the context of the proposed research agenda, as artists are often first to deconstruct the familiar and to facilitate an alternative lens to understand and critique these media. Is there such a thing as a social 'web aesthetics'? It is one thing to criticize Twitter and Facebook for their primitive and bland interface designs. How can we imagine the social in different ways? And how can we design and implement new interfaces to provide more creative freedom to cater to our multiple identities? Also, what is the scope of interventions with social media, such as, for example, the 'dislike button' add-on for Facebook? And what practices are really needed? Isn’t it time, for example, for a Facebook ‘identity correction’?

Am less interested in the purpose of these questions, which seems ultimately to study the feasibility of an academy-based Facebook.

No harm in considering alternatives, though, to what Dave Winer calls the "corporate blog silos."

As for those "artistic" questions, many of them have been mulled over here and elsewhere. Generally our ilk doesn't worry about bland interfaces--they've been called defaults and we actually like 'em. A dislike button for Facebook is trivial poop--a bit like scrawling a caricature of a guard on a prison wall, fine if it makes you feel better.

when the walls fell

darmok_hi5mountain

From Alan N. Shapiro's Star Trek: 20 Basic Principles:

Star Trek Basic Principle #7: Non-Signifying Language

In early capitalism, the law of accumulation is limited to the science of "political economy" and production. In late capitalism, it expands to wider instances of consumer culture; psychology (self and unconscious as psychic metaphors of capital); and linguistics ("signification" to infinity). In Chomsky’s linguistics, the brain is a "universal language machine" making possible the translation of all grammars and signifying systems. In Saussure’s linguistics, the playful gap between "signifier" and "signified" is barred by positing their equivalence in a linguistic sign that fixes a word’s identity. But language is sometimes other than a means of communication. In metaphor or poetry, or in the “mythical” speech of the Tamarians, language is not directly signifying. It is symbolic, ambivalent, evocative, and even destructive. "Meanings" are exchanged, subverted, enjoyed, and transformed in relationship and encounter.

image via hi5mountain